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China and Russia have engaged in enhanced cooperation in a number of areas in recent years.
Constantinos Filis assesses how Chinese-Russian relations have developed and whether a
strategic alliance between the two countries could eﬀectively balance the power of the West. He
writes that given the West’s usefulness to both Moscow and Beijing, the striking of a long-term
balance that is conducive to cooperation and increasing competition is likely to be the most
probable course.
The joint Chinese-Russian naval exercise in the Mediterranean ended a few days ago. Similar joint
exercises have been held in the Paciﬁc in an eﬀort, on the one hand, to point up the dynamic in their strategic
relations, and, on the other, to challenge U.S. naval superiority. Although such actions are for the time being more
symbolic than substantial in impact, their expanded geographical range nevertheless marks the development of
interests in regions beyond immediate vital Sino-Russian interests. But are Beijing and Moscow in a position, and
willing, to contend with Washington on a multilevel and global scale?
Let’s look ﬁrst at their limitations, the strongest of
which is the partially opportunistic nature of an
alliance between two powers that, in many areas, are
in heated competition with one another. If the power
gap between China and Russia continues to grow at
the current rate, Moscow will have to seek ways to
oﬀset the growing imbalance that, in the long term,
will undermine its position on the world stage.
Meanwhile, China will have little in the way of
reasons to back a country with political magnitude but
a shrinking reach, as well as a problematic economy
with growing needs that it may frequently be unable
to cover on its own. If, counter to expectations,
Moscow grows stronger, its aspirations will be diﬃcult
to keep in check. China currently values Russia as a
source of technological know-how and innovation, as
a supplier of natural gas – contributing in terms of
pricing and quantities to China’s negotiating leverage
with other suppliers – and as a fellow actor that shares Beijing’s desire to alter the current status quo.
So, even if they agree to work together on an equal footing, reality will inevitably reshape their cooperation
framework. It is precisely this imbalance that is rendering Moscow more ‘susceptible’ to facilitating Beijing’s
objectives, a trend being strengthened by Russia’s economic recession and rift with the West. In fact, the increasing
pressure the Kremlin is coming under from its Western partners – some of whom are attempting to exploit the
situation, not to force the adoption of a more constructive stance on the Ukraine issue, but to bring the Russian
economy to its knees – is eﬀectively forcing Russia into China’s embrace.
The latter, capitalising on the state of aﬀairs, concluded an energy agreement on particularly favourable terms;
assisted, through currency exchange, in the management of the dramatic fall in the ruble; and is ﬁrmly promoting the
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use of the Chinese currency in a number of bilateral transactions, creating, in parallel, a climate of trust while
pointing up its usefulness to Moscow. All of these function as something of a diversion from the clear risk of the
assimilation of Russian elements by neighbouring communities in China, while Moscow is not in a position to
adequately counter Beijing’s economic activities in Central Asia and development of energy synergies, both of which
have the potential to weaken Moscow’s role.
But what is it that brings Moscow and Beijing closer together? First of all, their shared stance against intervention in
domestic developments, even in the case of despotic regimes, which results from their inability to impact
developments beyond their immediate environs, as well as from their concern that such a precedent, once set,
could be used against them. They also share an uneasy awareness of the fact that “velvet” regime changes
engineered via revolutionary elements within given countries not only strengthen social movements that dispute the
centralisation of power, but also circumvent the UN, where both capitals hold veto power. Over the past decade or
so, Moscow and Beijing have voted together on many UN resolutions, having, in fact, opted for a tactic of greater
“exposure” of Russia and discreet, though visible, support of China.
Beyond that, they neighbour on a region rife with problems that they can confront more eﬀectively together. In
addition to facing regional security issues, they are pursuing inﬂuence with the aim of establishing a foothold against
the U.S. and its allies. Knowing that only the sum of their respective clout can alter the balance of power, they are
also prioritising their cooperation as a deterrent against competitors in the wider Asian region. It should be noted
that their claims are clearly more categorical in their near abroad, where they brook no challenge to their dominant
position.
A key aspect of and challenge for Sino-Russian relations is the creation of alternative institutional mechanisms as a
bulwark against those controlled by Western structures. Russia’s aim here is to mitigate Western pressure regarding
its geopolitical choices; Western pressure that has left Russia ﬁnancially isolated. China, on the other hand, wants to
free itself from Western rules and obligations regarding economic activities. Thus, the ultimate objective of recent
initiatives is the development of a more ﬂexible regulatory framework – amenable to the Eastern dynamic – followed
by the gradual adoption of more widely acceptable terms. Their common ground is their need for a less regulated
ﬁnancial/trade/business environment.
However, the attraction of access to signiﬁcant capital (from China) and ease of transactions with authoritarian
leaderships with no obligation to comply with the existing system is somewhat dimmed by (unsavoury) methods of
engagement as compared to the alternative, Western model of freedom of access to and provision of goods and
services, which facilitates movement and investment activities.
In a fragmented environment, multiple risks, evolving challenges, continuous economic integration, and the need to
ﬁnd common operative solutions – in combination with growing interdependency – eﬀectively push back to the
distant future any strong pursuit of changes to the existing status quo. Given, as well, the West’s multifaceted
usefulness to both Moscow and Beijing, the striking of a long-term balance that is conducive to cooperation and
increasing competition looks to be the most probable course.
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